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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
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_____________ 
 
No. 12-1770 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
        
 
v. 
CHARLES BURTON 
a/k/a Charles Roby 
 
CHARLES BURTON, 
                       Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 2-11-cr-00163-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Michael M. Baylson 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 25, 2013 
 
Before: FUENTES, FISHER, and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  July 24, 2013) 
_____________ 
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_____________ 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge 
Charles Burton was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  Burton filed a motion to suppress evidence, arguing 
that there was no reasonable suspicion for officers to stop the car in which the firearm 
was discovered.  The District Court denied his motion.  After a jury trial, Burton was 
convicted, and the District Court sentenced him to 120 months’ imprisonment.  Burton 
appeals the denial of his motion to suppress and the imposition of his sentence.  For the 
following reasons, we will affirm. 
I. 
Because we write primarily for the parties, we recite only the facts essential to our 
disposition of this appeal.  
On September 9, 2010, at approximately 1:10 a.m., a woman called 911 to report 
that there were five Hispanic men in a red car outside her house, three of whom had guns.  
She told police that the license plate number of the car was “EYM-6230.”  The complaint 
was transmitted over the radio, and Officers Pinkerton and Gorman responded to the call 
and met with the complainant.  Pinkerton testified that at this point the complainant told 
the officers that the individuals in the car were “black males,” App. 31, and she was 
afraid that the men were going to “shoot up her house.”  App. 26. 
After the officers left the complainant’s home, they observed an unoccupied red 
car parked a half block from her home, which had a license plate with the same first three 
letters as the plate the complainant reported.  The officers proceeded to search the area 
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for the owners or occupants of the car.  After a brief search, the officers returned to where 
the red car had been but it was gone. 
Meanwhile, twenty minutes after the broadcast of the complainant’s description of 
the vehicle over the radio, Officers Rommel and Biles observed a red car with the license 
plate “EYM-6380.”  Pinkerton later identified the car as “the same car that [he] had seen” 
parked near the complainant’s home.  App. 29.  Rommel stopped the car and its five 
occupants, including Charles Burton, all of whom were African-American.  The driver 
informed Rommel that there was a gun in the car, which he had a permit to carry.  At this 
point, the officers ordered the driver and four passengers to exit the car and proceeded to 
conduct pat-down searches of all five individuals.  Rommel testified that they did this 
“[b]ecause the call was for . . . three men armed with guns,” and he wanted “everyone out 
of the vehicle for [the officers’] safety.”  App. 65.  Once the men had exited the vehicle, 
Rommel observed a shotgun in the backseat where Burton had been sitting.  Burton was 
arrested and charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 
Before trial, Burton moved to suppress the shotgun, arguing that the stop was 
illegal because there was no basis for reasonable suspicion.  After hearing the testimony 
of the officers, the District Court held that this was “a clear case of an appropriate car 
stop . . . under the principles of Terry v. Ohio.”  App. 85.  The District Court found that 
there was sufficient evidence to support the stop, that the officers were authorized to have 
the occupants exit the car, and that the shotgun was discovered in plain view.  
Accordingly, the District Court denied the motion to suppress.  After a trial and 
conviction, the District Court sentenced Burton to a term of 120 months’ imprisonment. 
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II.
1
 
A. Motion to Suppress 
In reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we review the 
underlying finding of facts for clear error and exercise plenary review over legal 
conclusions.  United States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 993, 999 (3d Cir. 2008). 
Burton argues the car stop by police, which led to the discovery of the shotgun, 
was illegal because the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to support the stop.  
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures.  
U.S. Const. amend. IV.  However, “an officer may, consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”  Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 
123 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). 
When officers rely on a tip from an informant as the basis for reasonable suspicion 
for a Terry stop, we consider “the honesty of the caller, the reliability of his information, 
and the basis of his knowledge.”  United States v. Torres, 534 F.3d 207, 210-11 (3d Cir. 
2008) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983)).  We evaluate reliability based 
on five aspects of the tip; whether: 
1. The tip information was relayed from the informant to the officer in a 
face-to-face interaction such that the officer had an opportunity to 
appraise the witness’s credibility through observation. 
2. The person providing the tip can be held responsible if her allegations 
turn out to be fabricated. 
                                                 
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231, 3583(e), and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
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3. The content of the tip is not information that would be available to any 
observer . . . . 
4. The person providing the information has recently witnessed the alleged 
criminal activity. 
5. The tip predicts what will follow, as this provides police the means to 
test the informant’s knowledge or credibility . . . . 
 
Id. at 211. 
 In this case, there was sufficient reasonable suspicion to support the Terry stop.  In 
response to the 911 call, police met with the complainant where she provided a 
description to Pinkerton of a red car, a license plate number, the car’s occupants, and of 
the presence of guns.  This satisfies the first, second, and fourth Torres factors.  Her 
description of the guns and license plate number also was not available to any observer, 
satisfying the third factor.  While Burton argues that the vehicle and occupants did not 
sufficiently match the complainant’s description to constitute reasonable suspicion for a 
valid Terry stop, we do not agree.  A search is supported by reasonable suspicion if an 
officer can “articulate more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of 
criminal activity.”  Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123-24 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Furthermore, “due weight must be given . . . to the specific reasonable inferences which 
[an officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.”  Terry, 392 U.S. 
at 27.  The complainant described five African-American men in a red car with the 
license plate number EYM-6230, parked near her home.  Soon after, police saw five men 
in a red car with a very similar license plate number.  Furthermore, Officer Pinkerton 
testified that in his experience, witnesses often mistake portions of license plates.  Thus, 
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we hold that there was a sufficient basis to support the District Court’s finding of 
reasonable suspicion to stop the red car.   
 There was also a sufficient basis for officers to ask the occupants to exit the car in 
order to conduct a protective frisk.  See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111-12 
n.6 (1977) (holding that an officer’s ordering the driver to exit the car during a lawful 
Terry stop is a de minimis intrusion and is thus permissible); see also Maryland v. 
Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1997) (holding that an officer may order passengers to exit 
the car because there is likely more danger to an officer when passengers are present).  
Given the complainant’s tip that three of the men were armed and the driver’s admission 
that he had a gun, there was reasonable suspicion to conduct a protective frisk of all 
occupants.  See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (“The officer need not be absolutely certain that the 
individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances 
would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.”). 
The District Court properly found that once the occupants were out of the car, the 
shotgun in the back seat was in plain view of the police and subject to seizure.  See 
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235 (1985) (holding that police may lawfully 
seize an object if, during the course of a lawful stop, the object is in plain view of the 
officer).  Therefore, because the stop leading to the discovery of the shotgun was valid, 
we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Burton’s motion to suppress. 
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B. Sentencing 
In reviewing the District Court’s imposition of a sentence, we exercise plenary 
review over rulings on questions of law and its interpretation of the Sentencing 
Guidelines.  United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 307 n.2 (3d Cir. 2009).   
Burton contends that the District Court committed procedural error by failing to 
consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  Specifically, he claims that the 
District Court ignored the history and characteristics of the defendant.  A district court 
need only “set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the 
parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking 
authority.”  Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).  It is clear from our review 
that Burton addressed his history and characteristics before the District Court, focusing 
on his “unenviable” upbringing and the length of time between this conviction and his 
earlier convictions for robbery.  App. 102-2.
2
  The District Court specifically responded 
to Burton’s history and characteristics, pointing out other convictions, between those for 
robbery and the one at issue, including convictions for assault, possession of a controlled 
substance, and driving under the influence.  The District Court further responded to 
Burton’s arguments and described him as “dangerous to the public” and a “terrible 
recidivist [who] doesn’t seem to be able to conform his behavior to what society 
expects.”  App. 110.  Thus, we are satisfied that the District Court set forth enough in its 
                                                 
2
 Due to a pagination error, this quotation falls on an unpaginated page between App. 102 
and App. 103. 
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analysis of Burton’s history and characteristics to establish a reasoned basis for its 
sentence. 
In terms of whether the sentence was substantively reasonable, we will affirm a 
procedurally reasonable sentence “unless no reasonable sentencing court would have 
imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court 
provided.”  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  Based 
on Burton’s criminal history, including his numerous convictions for dangerous offenses, 
we cannot conclude that no sentencing court would have imposed this same sentence. 
III. 
 For the reasons discussed above, we will affirm the denial of Burton’s motion to 
suppress and the sentence imposed by the District Court. 
